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New York’s Court of Appeals has overturned decades-old precedent and permitted victims of animal-related injuries to recover damages against an animal’s owner. An injured person can now pursue claims against an animal’s owner if the defendant knew or should have known about the animal’s vicious propensity. A "vicious propensity" includes any behavior that reflects a proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm. An injured person can also recover if the defendant was negligent in causing animal-related injuries.
Background
In Flanders v. Goodfellow, a postal carrier was bitten while delivering a package to the defendants’ residence by the defendants’ dog. The dog lunged at the plaintiff and bit her shoulder to the extent it caused a “snap tear” to her shoulder muscle. The injury required multiple surgeries and resulted in permanent scarring. The plaintiff sued the defendants and asserted claims for strict liability and negligence.
There was evidence that the dog previously exhibited aggressive behavior, such as growling, barking and slamming into glass windows as the postal carriers approached the defendants’ house. There was no “Beware of Dog” sign posted at the defendants’ premises. However, the dog was known by other postal carriers to be aggressive, and the defendants had posted on social media about the difficulties with the dog’s training and behavior. The plaintiff’s negligence and strict liability cause of action were both dismissed by the lower courts.
The Court’s Reasoning
In part, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed based on long-standing precedent in New York which held that a negligence cause of action is not available for harm caused by a domestic animal. However, the plaintiff asked the Court of Appeals to reinstate her claims and to revisit the jurisprudence surrounding liability for the harmful acts of domestic animals.
The Court of Appeals noted that the prior jurisprudence could not be harmonized with traditional tort principles, which impose a duty to act with due care. By exempting the owners of domestic animals from negligence liability, the prior case law departed from the standard incentives to act with due care or risk being liable for damages. The Court of Appeals noted that New York had been an outlier in its failure to recognize these claims; for example, approximately 36 states recognized negligence as a distinct theory for animal-induced injuries. The Court of Appeals held that the current state of the law in New York regarding liability for animal-induced injuries is an obstacle in “the path to justice.”
Practical Implications
The Court of Appeals determined that there is now a two-pronged approach to liability for harms caused by animals. A plaintiff who suffers an animal-induced injury has a choice: if the owner knew or should have known that the animal had vicious propensities, the plaintiff may seek to hold the owner strictly liable. Alternatively, the plaintiff can rely on the rules of ordinary negligence and seek to prove that the defendant failed to exercise due care under the circumstances that caused the injury. A plaintiff could also assert both theories of liability against the animal’s owner.
This decision opens the door to a bevy of potential claims against the owners of animals and their insurers. Defense counsel will need to develop investigation and discovery strategies to keep these claims on a tight leash.
