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Segal McCambridge’s team, led by Shareholder Carla Varriale-Barker and Of Counsel Rashaan Williams, with assistance from law clerk Riggs Faulkenberry, obtained a pre-answer dismissal on behalf of the defendants, the Long Island Ducks (the “Ducks”), a minor league baseball team, and the Atlantic League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Inc. (the “League”).
The plaintiffs asserted negligence claims against the defendants, alleging that they failed to design, maintain or configure seating access at the stadium in a reasonably safe manner and failed to provide adequate warnings or safety protocols. They also asserted a cause of action pursuant to New York General Business Law Section 349, alleging that the defendants misrepresented the safety of the stadium by highlighting its safety features while omitting or downplaying the risks associated with certain seating sections.
The Ducks and the League demonstrated that the plaintiffs occupied seats that were not located in the area behind home plate, where the requisite protective netting was provided for spectators who wished to sit there. The plaintiffs did not plead or allege that they sought seating in the area behind home plate or that the protected area behind home plate was inadequate. In fact, the Court determined that the plaintiffs voluntarily sat in an unprotected area where foul balls are a commonly appreciated hazard.
The Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules 3211(a)(1), finding that the plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action was conclusively defeated by documentary evidence, including the plaintiffs’ tickets reflecting seating in an unprotected area, photographs of the protected area located behind home plate, and warning signs posted in and around the area where the plaintiffs were seated. The Court also dismissed the negligence claim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) because the pleading failed to state a cause of action. The Court highlighted both the limited duty of care set forth in New York’s “Baseball Rule” and the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk as independent bases for dismissal of the negligence claim.
The Court confirmed that the duty of care owed to spectators at a baseball game is a limited one and held that liability arises only if a plaintiff was seated in, or sought access to, the protected area, or if the adequacy of the required behind-home-plate screening is challenged. Here, there were no such allegations, and the plaintiffs’ pleading foreclosed any claim for breach of the limited duty of care.
Additionally, the Court applied the primary assumption of the risk doctrine, noting that it bars recovery where the injury arises from a commonly appreciated risk inherent in the activity, and that the doctrine applies equally to spectators who place themselves near the activity.
One key takeaway from this Order is that the Ducks provided at least the required protection behind home plate, and the pleadings and record on the motion confirmed the absence of any request by the plaintiffs for seating in the protected area. The plaintiffs were unable to establish a breach of the limited duty of care. The Court also applied the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk to dismiss the case because the plaintiffs voluntarily sat in an unprotected area where foul balls were a commonly appreciated hazard. Although the risk of injury was common and inherent, the Ducks provided multiple warnings regarding the danger posed by foul balls entering the stands. These proactive measures prevented the case from proceeding to discovery and depositions—a grand slam for the Ducks and the League.
